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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the presence of financial constraints among 
firms in Malaysia using firm level panel data analysis. The empirical 
results based on panel GMM demonstrate that financial constraints 
are present in the market, which indicate that the firms are unable to 
access to external forms of financing. In addition, the presence also 
signifies the presence of asymmetric information problem between 
the firm and its financer. Thus, the neoclassical investment theory 
which based on assumption of complete information such that only 
factor prices and technology determine firm’s desired capital stock is 
simply rejected. Eventually, their investments are much affected by 
fluctuations in their cash flows or retained earnings.
Keywords: Financial constraints, investment, cash flow, imperfect 
market, panel data
INTRODUCTION
Financial constraints can be defined as financial obstacles that hinder firms to 
have access to external funds in financing their investment activities. The first 
study that raises the importance of financial constraints in investment decisions 
was done by Fazzari et al. (1998). Prior to the study, earlier studies undermined 
the role of internal finance in the investment decision (Vilasuso 1997). One of the 
studies is by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who construct a theory of which real 
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firm’s investment is irrelevant to its financial structure. This indicates that firm’s 
market value is not affected by its financial structure. 
Jorgenson (1963) used the foundation to construct the so-called neoclassical 
theory of investment. The theory assumes that in investment activities, firms face 
cost of capital in order to acquire the desired stock of capital. The financial factors 
are unimportant in this model because the optimization process of firms does not 
depend on the factors1. The model only takes into account factors that may affect 
the cost of capital such as changes in the tax policy. Under assumptions of both 
theories internal and external funds are assumed perfect substitutes which imply 
that firms may easily obtain external funds to smooth their investments.
In contrast, in real life the capital market is not perfect due to the presence 
of information asymmetries2. As a result, economic agents are not equally well 
informed and the internal and external funds are no more perfect substitutes. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed how information asymmetries affect equity 
financing where outside investors will ask for premium to purchase a firm’s 
equity. For debt financing, due to the information asymmetries, lenders may 
only fulfill a part of borrowers’ requirements for loans. Even, if lenders agree to 
give loans, they may do rationing to mitigate risks caused by adverse selection 
problems. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that the credit rationing is practiced 
to mitigate problems of information asymmetries.
The second factor that causes the market imperfection is agency problem. 
The problem is closely related to the information problems because it sterms from 
a situation where outside investors do not have enough relevant information on 
firm investment activities and returns. On the other hand, managers who have 
inside information may pursue their own interests rather than interest of outside 
investors. Therefore, to avoid the interest of outsiders to be jeopardized, they 
implement management control. However, this practice produces additional costs 
to the management. Consequently, prospective investors are also unwilling to 
purchase shares in the firm except at a reduced price (Schiantarelli 1996). This 
conflict of interest increases the cost of external finance (Oliner & Rudebusch 
1992).
1 The financial factors include measures of profitability, leverage and liquidity.
2 There are three sources of the market imperfection which include information asymmetries, agency 
cost and transaction cost (Oliner and Rudebusch 1992; Kadapakkam et al. 1998; Koo and maeng 
2005). Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) find that information asymmetries are a source of financing 
hierarchy while transaction cost shows no significant role to the hierarchy. The existence of financing 
hierarchy indicates the external and internal financing are not perfect substitutes that represents the 
presence of financial constraints. For the case of agency cost, there is a close relationship between 
information asymmetries and agency cost because information problems create the conflict of 
interest between inside and outside investors. Thus, two significant source of financing hierarchy are 
information asymmetries and agency problem. Therefore, Bhaduri (2005) argues that the magnitude 
of market imperfection depends on information asymmetries and agency problems.
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In the above situation, the firms become less accessible to external funds. 
As a result, the firms have to retain most of their profits gained from previous 
investments and pay fewer dividends that year in order to smooth their 
investment activities in the future. Once the firms have exhausted all internal 
funds, they cannot proceed to another investment. As a result, their investment 
becomes very sensitive to availability of flows of internal funds and, thus their 
investment may fluctuate. This kind of firms is financially constrained. However, 
if they are still able to use external funds to smooth their investments in spite 
of having the mentioned problems, the firms therefore, are not financially 
constrained. 
Fazzari et al. (1988) find that financial factors affect investment. This finding 
explains the presence of financial constraints. Other recent papers also find that the 
financial constraints are present in capital markets they examined. Shaller (1993) 
finds that the financial constraints are present in Canadian market but affect only 
certain firms. Barran and Peeters (1998) find that Belgian firms’ investments are 
dependent on financial factors. It suggests the presence of financial constraints 
in Belgian market.
Cleary (2006) finds that the financial constraints are presents in seven world 
largest economies: Autralia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  Kadapakkam et al. (1998) find that there is a significant 
relationship between investment and internal fund availability after testing for 
six OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
comprising of the United States, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, France and 
Japan. The results show that the cash flow variable contributes significantly to the 
explanatory power of the regression in all countries, except Japan.
Bond et al. (2003) constructed panel data sets of manufacturing firms in 
the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and Germany. The results show that 
the financial constraints are presents in all the countries but the constraints are 
relatively more severe in the United Kingdom. Bougheas et al. (2003) find that 
investment in R&D is financially constrained in the Republic of Ireland. This 
finding support previous studies of US firms for example Hall (1992), Hao and 
Jaffe (1993), and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994).
Therefore, this study is primarily aimed to examine the presence of financial 
constraints among firms in Malaysia. This study is crucial to investigate the 
presence of the financial constraints and their effects on firm’s investment 
activities since the presence of financial constraints can cause the firms to be 
less accessible to external funds.  The information on financial constraints and 
their effects on firm investment are also very useful for policy makers. Using this 
information they can ascertain appropriate monetary policies to release the effects 
of financial constraints on firms’ investments and increase their accessibility 
to financing sources. This is important in order to achieve the ultimate goal of 
sustainable growth generated by private investment.
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This paper is organized as follows: The first section is Introduction, followed 
by the Q Model of Investment, Estimation Approach, Data Sources and, finally 
the Results and the Conclusion.
THE Q MODEL OF INVESTMENT
According to Toit and Moolman (2004), there are four investment models 
namely the accelerator model, cash-flow model, neoclassical model and Tobin’s 
Q model3. Among them, the most widely used in previous studies is the Q model 
of investment (Laeven 2002; Harrison et al. 2004). This model is going to be 
employed in this study to investigate investment and financial constraints. To 
derive the model, the derivations made by Koo and Maeng (2005), Forbes (2003) 
and Harrison et al. (2004) are followed.
First of all, each firm is assumed to maximize its present value which comprises 
of expected stream of discounted dividends subject to the external financing4 and 
capital accumulation constraints. Therefore, the firm value becomes,
 V(Kt, ξt) = maxIt+s∞s =0
Dt + Et
s=1
∞
 βt+s–1Dt+s  (1)
Equation (1) is maximized subjected to the constraints, respectively are,
 Dt = ∏(Kt, ξt) – C(It, Kt) – It (2)
 Kt+1 = (1 – δ)Kt + It (3)
where t is the subscript for current period of time; s is the increment to t; Kt is the 
capital stock at the start of the period t; ξt is a productivity (technology) shock; 
Dt is the dividend paid at time t; Et [•] is the expectation operator conditional on 
information available at time t; β is a discount factor; ∏ (•) is the maximized 
profit function with respect to variable costs; C is the adjustment cost function; 
It is the investment over the period t; and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Equation (3) above is the Hall-Jorgenson gross investment model. This 
is because the Hall-Jorgenson’s model of investment is a difference of capital 
stock between two periods of time. Besides, equation (2) contains adjustment 
3 In fact, there are many investment theories and models. The four are concluded by these authors. 
The other authors may conclude slightly different. For instance, Samuel (1998) distinguishes at least 
five theories of investments; accelerator theory, cash flow theory, neoclassical theory (Jorgenson-
type), modified neoclassical theory (Bischoff-type) and Q theory.
4 Love (2003) defines this constraint as sources equal users constraint.
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cost function, C(It, Kt), to take into account the installation costs once the capital 
stocks change due to investment or disinvestment. This is in accordance to 
Hayashi (1982).
Rewriting equation (1) into Bellman equation produces,
 V(Kt) =  maxIs∞s =t
Dt + βt+1Et[Vt+1(Kt)] (4)
Next, taking the first order condition of (4) with respect to investment gives,
 VI t = – CI t – 1 + Bt+1Et VKt+1 = 0 (5)
Then, defining marginal Q as the increase in firm value for an additional unit of 
capital which is,
 Qt = VKt+1 (6)
Assuming that adjustment cost function is quadratic and the specification of 
the cost function is modified to include lagged ratio of investment to capital to 
represent the persistence in the investment-capital ratio that is presumed exist in 
the data. As a result, the adjustment cost function becomes,
 C(It, Kt) = 
ω
2
  ItKt – γ
It–1
Kt–1
 – ν2Kt  (7)
Next, taking the first order condition of (7) with respect to investment to obtain 
the marginal adjustment costs of investment which is,
 CI t = ω  ItKt – γ
It–1
Kt–1
 – ν (8)
Substituting (6) and (8) into (5) gives,
 VI  = ω  ItKt – γ
It–1
Kt–1
 – νt – 1 + βt+1Et [Qt] = 0 (9)
Rearranging (9),
  IKt = – 1ω + γ IKt–1 + 1ω βt+1E [Qt] + ν (10)
Since this model contains an expectational operator, the model cannot be estimated. 
Therefore, an assumption should be imposed on this expectational model. This 
can be done through the rational expectations to omit the expectational operator. 
In the rational expectations, the expected values are replaced with realized values 
and an expectational error. This expectational error is assumed to be orthogonal 
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to any available information when an investment decision is made. Thus, (10) 
becomes
  IKt = – 1ω + γ IKt–1 + 1ω βt+1Qt  + ν + εt (11)
Since ν contains the fixed effect for each firm, ft and time specific effect, dt the 
above equation can be used to construct the standard Q model,
  IKit = c + β1 IKi(t–1) + β2Qit + fi + dt + εit (12)
where the subscript i denotes individual firms (i = 1, 2, 3, …, N ), c = – 1
ω
, 
β1 = γ and β2 = βt+11ω. This model, however, does not show the effects of 
financial condition on firm investments. Yet, this standard model is consistent 
with the MM theorem.
As argued in Fazarri et al. (1988), cash flow represents the availability of 
internal funds. Thus, this variable can capture firm’s financial position. Then, 
equation (12) is modified to include cash flow, CF which is scaled by capital. 
Thus, the modified cash flow Q model becomes
  IKit = c + β1 IKi(t–1) + β2Qit + β3CFK it + fi + dt + εit (13)
The sensitivity of investment-cash flow will be shown by the value of β3. The 
coefficient is expected to be significantly positive to show the presence of 
financial constraints.
ESTIMATION APPROACH
This study uses panel data estimation to examine the research problem. The panel 
data estimation is being common and increasingly used in economic and other 
social studies (Gujarati 2003; Arellano 2003; Hsiao 2003). Hsiao (2003) finds that 
this development is partly contributed by the availability of panel data sets and 
partly by the rapid growth in computational power of the individual researcher. 
In addition, Baltagi (2005) argues that many economic relationships are dynamic 
in nature. One of the advantages of panel data is the ability to study the dynamics 
of adjustment. The Q model derived above includes lagged dependent variable as 
a regressor. The presence of this regressor characterizes the dynamic relationship 
in the models. Therefore, this study uses the dynamic panel estimation to examine 
the models.
As in many previous studies, for example, Laeven (2002), Koo and Maeng 
(2005), Ghosh (2006), Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2000) and Gelos and Werner 
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(2002), this study will use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. 
The method has advantages in estimating the panel data, as it is able to overcome 
unobserved individual effect, endogeneity of explanatory variables and the use 
of lagged dependent variables by applying full set of moment conditions without 
ignoring the difference structure on the residual disturbances (Baltagi 2005). 
There are two types of GMM. The first GMM is the difference GMM which was 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Arellano and Bover (1995) developed a 
new GMM technique to incorporate the Hausman-Taylor (1981) IV in order to 
obtain efficient results of dynamic panel data. Blundell and Bond (1998) used the 
orthogonality conditions given in Arellano and Bover (1995) and introduced the 
second GMM i.e. the system GMM, in order to overcome the weak instruments 
of the difference GMM. To apply both GMM, first differencing process is made 
upon equation (13) to eliminate the unobserved effects.
The success of the model to produce unbiased, consistent and efficient results 
depends very much on the appropriate adoption of instruments. There are three 
tests used in this study to identify the validity of the instruments adopted in the 
models. The null hypotheses of these tests indicate the validity of the models. 
Therefore, if the nulls fail to be rejected at least at 10 percents significance level, 
though the nulls are true, the instrument variables are valid.
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions tests the validity the moment 
conditions imposed in the GMM (Blundell et al. 2000). In fact, it is a double-edge 
sword to test for the model specification and orthogonality conditions (Baum 
et al. 2002). Once the moment conditions (orthogonality conditions) hold, the 
instruments are valid and the model is correctly specified. The Sargan statistics 
follow χ 2 distribution with the degrees of freedom equals p – k, where p is the 
number of columns of matrix of instruments, and k is the number of column 
of matrix of observations. On the other hands, to test the validity of additional 
moment conditions of the system GMM, the Difference Sargan test is used. 
This test measures the difference between the Sargan statistics of System 
GMM and first difference GMM. The difference Sargan statistics also follow 
χ 2 distribution but with the degrees of freedom equals the number of additional 
restrictions. If the difference between the two Sargan statistics is not significant 
at least at 10 percents of significance level, the additional moment conditions are 
valid. The serial correlation test tests the hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation for the error term in the first difference equation. Baltagi (2005) 
argues that this test is crucial because it identifies the consistency of the GMM 
estimators.
Both GMM estimation techniques will be applied in this study. For 
comparison, results from ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effects (FEM) and 
random effects (REM) models are also presented. Time dummies are included 
in all models. The inclusion of the time dummies increases the number of 
instruments variables to be added into the matrix of instruments for the GMM. All 
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GMM estimations will be implemented using one-step and two-step estimations. 
For the two-step GMM, Windmeijer’s (2000; 2005) correction is applied.
DATA SOURCES
A sample of firms traded at the Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board is selected. This 
is because this study uses the Q model which requires market values of shares 
to measure the average Q which is not applicable to non-listed companies. This 
study makes use the Thomson Financial (Datastream) to extract the relevant 
company’s financial data. The data consists of annual data ranging from 1988 
to 2005. The data shows that some of the firms have been listed since 1988, but 
many of them entered the stock market sometime later. Hence, the data becomes 
unbalanced. In order to do regression, the unbalanced panel data method is 
applied in the study.
This raw data is then refined by deleting some firms. The firms deleted 
are those contain missing values which can cause discontinuities if they are 
not dropped. Besides, the firms that operate in the market less than 5 years are 
also deleted. This minimum year of operation criterion is important to avoid 
data reduction due to first differencing process and adoption of lagged values. 
Between 1988 and 2005, the financial crisis hit Malaysia in 1997–1998. Some 
firms were severely affected by the crisis and became financially distressed.
There are also firms which were managed badly and suffered from the 
financial depression even the economy was outside the crisis period. For this 
reason, this study deletes firms which suffered at least three years of negative 
net income during the period of 1988 to 2005. In this case, Bhagat et al. (2005) 
argued that there are three types of relationship between investment of distressed 
firms and their internal funds; it can be positive, weakly positive or strongly 
negative. Besides that, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) argued that all firm sell 
assets but the asset sales by the financially distressed firms are less likely to be 
reinvested. So, this is important to drop the distressed firms out of the sample in 
order to avoid negative relationship between investment and cash flow due to 
negative net income.
In addition, financial firms are also removed from the sample (Agung 2000) 
because they are highly cash flow but lowly investment firms. Thus, excluding 
the firms may prevent the sample from the effects of influential outliers. Next, 
one percent top and bottom values for each variable are deleted. This deletion is 
crucial to overcome the presence of outliers affected by bubbles (Bhagat et al. 
2005) and eliminate influential variables (Love 2003) in the data that may cause 
estimation bias which leads to ‘flawed conclusions’. Eventually, the number of 
firms that remain in the sample is 353 firms or 2,316 of firm-year observations.
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Variables Definition
The variables used in this study as required by the investment model (13) are 
investment (I ), capital (K ), average Q (Q) and cash flow (CF ). The definition of 
each variable is as follows,
i. Investment
 It is the current period investment of time t. It is equal to the purchase of 
property, plant and equipment. In this study, capital expenditure is used as 
a proxy of investment instead of using investment in fixed assets. This is 
because investment in fixed assets involves accounting depreciation which 
is possibly different from depreciation employed in the economy. Hence, it 
can be an improper measure for investment. Besides that, it also consists of 
net level of capital stock which is in book value that is also closely dependent 
on accounting depreciation. Bhagat et al. (2005), Harrison et al. (2004), 
Moyen (2004) and Love (2003) used capital expenditure as the proxy of 
investment.
ii. Capital
 It is the net firm fixed assets which exclude depreciation at the beginning of 
period t. It includes property, plant and equipment. The investment is scaled 
by the level of net fixed assets. The use of net fixed assets can account for 
differences across firms (Kadapakkam et al. 1998). 
iii. Cash flow
 It is defined as operating income plus depreciation. It is the beginning of 
period t cash flow. The depreciation includes total depreciation, amortization 
and depletion. This variable is used to measure the degree of market 
imperfections caused by the financial constraints. 
iv. Q
 It is the beginning of period t Q. It is measured by dividing book value 
of total debt and market capitalization by firm total assets. The market 
capitalization is defined as common shares outstanding multiplied by their 
respective market prices. This definition of Q was used in Koo and Maeng 
(2005). 
THE RESULTS
The results are summarised in Table 1. There are a total of 2316 observations from 
the unbalanced panel of 353 firms from 1989 to 2005. All estimations, except the 
system GMM results, show that the cash flow-capital ratios are statistically and 
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positively significant. All other variables have expected signs and are significant 
at least at the five percent significance level, except for the constants. In the 
FEM, the lagged investment-capital ratio is statistically insignificant. For the 
system GMM estimations, the constants are significant at ten percent and five 
percent significance levels for the 1-step and 2-step GMM, respectively. Wald 
tests are used to test the joint significance of all coefficients except the constant 
for REM and GMM. For OLS and FEM, F-tests are used instead. Both tests 
show that the coefficients in each model are jointly significant at the one percent 
level. 
For the system GMM estimations, the constants are significant at the ten 
percent and five percent levels for the 1-step and 2-step GMM, respectively. 
The significance of the constants implies the importance of adjustment cost 
associated with any change in investment. A high value of constant shows that 
the adjustment cost is small since c = – 1ω where it is the ratio of numeraire of 
investment good price to price of the adjustment cost. This cost reduces firm 
(retained) profit pertaining to investment goods. Based on the 1-step system 
GMM results, the constant is (= 0.044), and β2 = βt+11ω is (= 0.064), therefore ω 
is equal to 22.727.
The lagged investment-capital ratio is significant for almost all models. The 
significance of the ratio indicates a strong persistence in the investment-capital 
ratio. It shows the link between current and lagged investments (Laeven 2003). 
It implies that it is easier for the firm to continue investment at some fraction 
γ of the previous period ratio, for example, it has hired workers or made some 
other arrangements that would be costly to cancel (Love 2003) which hinders 
the current investment level to adjust immediately to the new optimal level 
(Bhaduri 2005). It is also interpreted as the coefficient of adjustment.
As has been argued that the OLS estimate of the lagged variable is likely 
to be biased upwards and FEM Within estimate on the other hand is likely to 
be biased downwards (Bond 2002). The coefficients in Table 1 show the results 
that the coefficient of OLS is higher than that of FEM. Also, as expected, the 
estimates of GMM are between the OLS’s and FEM’s values. Since this condition 
is fulfilled, the GMM specification is valid. The results for all models show that 
firm’s investment is responsive to future expected profit represented by the Q. 
This supports the Q theory such that firm will invest until the marginal Q equals 
to one.
The cash flow-capital ratio is significant for all models except the system 
GMM. Therefore, in order to obtain consistent and reliable results, additional 
tests are carried out to determine the validity of instruments adopted in the 
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GMM models. The tests are second order serial correlation test5, Sargan test6 and 
difference Sargan test7.
The second order serial correlation test shows that all GMMs are first 
order serially correlated but not in the second order. Therefore, the estimators 
are consistent such that, E(∆ εit ∆ εit–2) = 0. The Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions indicates that the moment conditions hold in the GMM model. This 
is because the results obtained show that the Sargan statistics are statistically 
insignificant at least at the ten percent level. It indicates that the instruments used 
in the models are valid.
The validity of additional moments examined using a difference Sargan test 
indicates that the additional moment conditions imposed into the 2-step system 
GMM are valid at a higher level of probability value. According to Roodman 
(2006), this implausibly good p-value is due to too many instruments. Yet, 
Roodman argues, there is little guidance on how to indicate the instruments are 
too many or not, since even in some cases in a few instruments the bias is still 
present. Hence, the researcher should be cautious in interpreting this result. Even 
though the errors of each estimate in the two-step GMMs are corrected using 
Windmeijer (2000; 2005), the computation of Sargan test is based on transformed 
two-step residuals which are not subject to robustness’s correction8. In the 1-step 
system GMM, the additional instruments are not valid because the statistics is 
significant at the ten percent level.
Hence, based on the tests, it is noted that the results of the difference GMM 
are the most consistent and efficient results to indicate the presence of financial 
constraints in the Malaysian capital market. The cash flow-capital ratio variable 
to proxy the presence of financial constraints is statistically significant at the five 
percent level for both 1- and 2-step GMM. The significance of cash flow-capital 
ratio implies the imperfect substitutability between external and internal finance. 
In this case, cash flow provides cheaper form of finance as compared to other 
forms of finance such as share issuance and loans. Besides, the significance of 
the cash flow-capital ratio also shows the importance of the financial variables in 
investment decision making. Therefore, the assumption of neoclassical model of 
perfect capital market is rejected.
Thus, it indicates that firms in the Malaysian capital market are in general 
financially constrained. This finding is consistent with previous studies of 
different countries such as the studies by Schaller (1993), Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu 
5 In Stata 10, this test can be computed only when the errors are robust.
6 In Stata 10, this test can be computed only when the errors are GMM-type errors or homoskedastic 
errors.
7 The statistics of this test are self-computed according to the formula discussed in Estimation 
Approach.
8 This is because the asymptotic distribution of Sargan test is unknown if the variance-covariance 
estimators are assumed robust.
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(1997), Barran and Peeters (1998), Cleary (2006), Kadapakkam et al. (1998) 
and Bond et al. (2003). Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997) found that financial 
constraints affect investment for a subset of U.S. firms since only a panel of 561 
firms from 1971–1992 was tested. Similar result is also shown by Schaller (1993) 
and others.
In addition, the measure of the severity of the constraints, as indicated by 
the degree of financial constraints, can be seen at the value of the coefficient of 
the variable which is low and less than one (= 0.091). This implies that for every 
10 percent increase in cash flow will increase 0.91 percent of investment. 
Although, the degree of severity is relatively low (= 0.091), this finding is still 
very crucial for the policy maker to formulate a policy that will not worsen 
the constraints. If these firms constitute at least a major portion of investment 
activities in the market, the constraints may affect the economy. This is because 
their investment fluctuations may give impact to fluctuations in investment at the 
aggregate level through the investment component of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
CONCLUSION
As been argued in previous studies, the presence of financial constraints hinders 
firms to have easy access to external funds. As a result, the constrained firms have 
to retain enough portions of their income flows to finance future investments. 
Eventually, the investments become relatively volatile and may fluctuate 
depending on the availability of the internal funds. Using annual data of 1988 to 
2005, the results show that the financial constraints are present in the Malaysian 
capital market. Although, the degree of severity is relatively low (= 0.091), this 
finding is still very crucial for the policy maker to formulate a policy that will not 
worsen the constraints. 
The finding gives the policy maker a good sight on capital market conditions 
in order to prepare precautionary measures regarding any possible external 
economic shocks for example setting special financial funds to provide financial 
aids to the effected firms. However, to identify which types of firms are more 
severely constrained and which are less needs further research. This is because 
the fluctuations in the economy may become worse under the existence of 
financial constraints because the constraints can magnify the macroeconomic 
effect of shocks to cash flow or liquidity that will reduce some firms’ access to 
low-cost finance and worsen their balance sheet finance at the firm level (Fazzari 
et al. 1988).
Furthermore, this study is also helpful as the presence of financial constraints 
also determines the success of monetary policies to enhance economic growth as 
the constraints can magnify the shocks initiated by the policies specifically the 
unanticipated monetary policies (Kocherlakota 2000). For instance, Bank Negara 
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Malaysia (BNM) implements an unanticipated contractionary monetary policy. 
This decrease in money supply leads to an increase in interest rate. The rise in 
interest rate may induce reduction in output because the cost of external finance 
increases and firms’ ability to carry out investment decreases. In the presence of 
financial constraints, the situation becomes worse since the policy also affects 
negatively the supply of loans in banking sector that may be translated into 
worsening firm’s balance sheet which finally reduces output. Therefore, Agung 
(2000) suggests the government to be careful in implementing any policy by 
taking into account the role of financial constraints, otherwise the policy will 
deteriorate the current economic situation.
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